每分钟单词数
203
Darsh_KEWAT
00:00
速度
Learned counsel for petitioner submits that original petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Lineman on probation with effect from 27.06.1998. Subsequently, petitioner was confirmed on the post of Lineman with effect from Thereafter, on petitioner was placed under suspension. Thereafter, on 28.12.2005, petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment in Sessions Trial No.273/2002 under of the IPC and due to conviction, petitioner was terminated from service vide order dated 20.12.2006. It is further submitted that petitioner filed Criminal Appeal No.97/2006, which was allowed on 18.11.2017 and the petitioner was acquitted. It was held in the said order that the original petitioner could not be implicated for the offence of murder with the aid of of the IPC in the absence of the essential ingredients of common intention/common object. It is further submitted that thereafter the petitioner submitted a representation before the respondents but no action was taken by them. Consequently, petitioner filed the present writ petition on. During the pendency of the present petition, original petitioner expired on and the legal representatives of petitioner were brought on record. It is further submitted that once petitioner had been acquitted by the Higher Court, original petitioner was entitled to reinstatement in service from the date of acquittal i.e., Despite the aforesaid, respondents did not reinstate the petitioner in service and during the pendency of the present petition, original petitioner expired; therefore, the present petitioner, being the legal representatives of the original petitioner, are entitled to family pension and other consequential benefits. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents submits that the services of petitioner were terminated as the petitioner had been convicted by the Sessions Court, Ashok Nagar. It is further submitted that the acquittal of the original petitioner was on the basis of benefit of doubt and prosecution has failed to prove the charges and since the charges under of the IPC levelled against the petitioner were heinous in nature, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of reinstatement. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Petitioner's submissions considered. This Court has already acquitted the petitioner in Criminal Appeal No.97/2006 in the following manner: Mohan Singh (appellant in cannot be implicated for the offence allowed to the extent indicated above. Once orginal petitioner has been acquitted by this Court, the original petitioner became entitled to reinstatement with immediate effect from 18.11.2017 and there was a fault on the part of the respondents in not reinstating the petitioner in service. It is a settled position of law that acquittal on the basis of benefit of doubt or failure of the prosecution to prove its case is deemed to be a clean acquittal and there is no distinction between acquittal on benefit of doubt and clean acquittal. Therefore, the original petitioner was entitled to reinstatement with effect from It is a matter of record that the State has not challenged the judgment of acquittal before any superior forum. The conviction having been judicially annulled, the legal substratum of the dismissal order stands vitiated. It is trite that once the conviction is set aside, unless a separate departmental proceeding is initiated to establish independent misconduct or unsuitability for service, the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement. Reported in this Court has again held that in case a minor punishment has been inflicted upon an employee, he is entitled for full pay and allowances. Even after an order of acquittal by the competent Court, respondents have continued him under termination. However, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not willing to work; but it was the employer, who had not permitted the employee to perform his duties due to termination order. Therefore, the application of principle of 'no work no pay' in the facts of present case is arbitrary and denial of arrears of the salary for this reason is also arbitrary. In this context, I may profitably refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others Jankiraman and others reported in (1991) 4 SCC 109 while discussing the In the present case, the respondent was acquitted by the appellate court. There can be no manner of doubt that the said acquittal would relate back and the initial order of conviction would stand obliterated. On that basis, there can be no manner of doubt that the substratum of the cause that had led to the respondent's dismissal/discharge in the present case had ceased to exist. The same would entitle him to be reinstated in service, an act that has been duly performed by the appellant Bank." As the original petitioner has already expired on 27.03.2023, no order of reinstatement can now be passed. However, there was no fault on the part of the original petitioner and, therefore, the legal representatives of the petitioner are entitled to consequential benefits. Considering the aforesaid, this petition is allowed and disposed of in the following terms:- The respondents are directed to pay 25% of the salary from the date of acquittal i.e. till the death of the original petitioner, The respondents shall pay all consequential benefits treating the original petitioner to have died during service tenure and shall also extend the benefit of family pension and other death- The respondents shall comply with the aforesaid directions within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which they shall pay interest per annum from the date of entitlement till actual payment.