To counter these threats, the state has also initiated certain policymaking processes, but none of the policy frameworks has changed the practices of the state institutions. In 2021, the government revised the 20-point NAP to an abridged version of 14 points. While many clauses have been retained as such from the original draft, some have been amended, and a couple of new ones have been included in the revised plan. However, no clause talks about negotiations with terrorists that the state has initiated with the TTP. Similarly, the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) has submitted another draft of the National[TQ1] Counter Violent Extremism Policy to the Ministry of Interior. The policy comprehensively chalks out the plan for countering violent threats triggered by extremism, but none of its clauses endorses reconciliation with the TTP, which has become a major threat to social cohesion and internal security. Though one clause in both the original and revised NAP endorses reconciliation in Balochistan, it does not elaborate with whom the state will reconcile — the separatist groups fighting on the ground or the exiled nationalist leaders who are waiting for a better deal from the state? Apparently, instead of initiating an effective reconciliation process, the government’s exclusive focus appears set on the Peaceful Balochistan Programme, which entails providing financial and rehabilitation support to the Baloch insurgents surrendering before the authorities and quitting violence. The federal government also approved the country’s so-called first-ever and very secretive National Security Policy (2022-26) last year. As the full details of the NSP are not yet known, one can assume it may contain the real policy which is in practice, especially about the negotiations with terrorists and extremists. The state institutions might have calculated the strategic and political advantages of the Taliban regime in Kabul, but they also need to evaluate the implications for Pakistan’s internal security and impact on society. The Afghan situation will bear upon Pakistan in many ways. First, a protracted conflict and insecurity in Afghanistan, as being projected by many, will affect Pakistan’s border security as well as the militant landscape in its bordering areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. Secondly, the fight between the IS-K and Taliban has already entered Pakistan where the former has carried out multiple attacks in recent years on alleged Afghan Taliban members and religious scholars in Balochistan and KP purportedly ‘linked’ with them. Thirdly, the Afghan situation is weighing heavily on Pakistan’s efforts to pursue ‘economic diplomacy’ in the world; it is also affecting Pakistan’s efforts to connect with emerging regional geo-economics, mainly due to persisting insecurity and political volatility caused by the Afghan situation. Fourthly, matters as they stand in Afghanistan now are not in any way helping Pakistan’s efforts to deal with the militant groups threatening its security such as the TTP.State institutions have an urgent task at hand to reduce the gaps in policy and practice, but more essentially, they have to expand their practices to counter the emerging threats. Perhaps, more than broad-brush NAP and NSP, Pakistan needs to devise a clear and precise ‘Taliban policy’ and similar policies about groups like the TTP and TLP.